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CREATING KIN: NEW FAMILY ASSOCIATIONS 
AS WELFARE PROVIDERS IN LIBERALIZING 
JORDAN 
In the decade and a half since economic liberalization began in Jordan, a little noticed 
but large-scale organizing trend has taken over the formal provision of social welfare, 
redefining the institutional conception of familial identity in the process.1 For over 
one third of the population, kin solidarities have been reorganized, formalized, and 
registered as nongovernmental organizations in an attempt to cope with the removal 
of basic social provisioning by the state. Although kinship clearly has been a major 
element in Jordan's history, the present phenomena alter traditional familial institutions, 
change kin lineages, and institutionalize the economic salience of family relations. In 
tum, the relationship of the populace to the state has changed, marginalizing previously 
regime-supporting groups and facilitating the implementation of economic neoliber-
alism without significant protest. Repackaged as charitable elements of civil society, 
these family associations are sanctioned and encouraged by the state and international 
community. Although they are not regime creations, family associations reinforce the 
Jordanian regime's efforts at political deliberalization. The new elites who head the 
organizations have been placated through indirect incorporation into the regime; they 
now wield significant economic power over fellow kin and have enhanced social status 
backed by the new group. Furthermore, the trend mainly consists of families without 
immediate ambitions of entering national politics. These are not the traditional elite 
families. 
The growth of family or kin associations (jama'iyyiit 'ii'iliyya)2 has been dramatic: in 
the decade following initial structural adjustment, over 400 associations organized along 
various kinship lines were established in a population of less than six million. Almost 
60 percent of all existing kinship organizations were formed during the ten-year period 
between 1989 and 1999. Amman alone, with a population of less than two million, had 
197 family associations in 2000, 113 of which were established since liberalization, the 
rest having been established over the previous four plus decades. Family associations 
formed since 1989 currently represent the largest organizational category in the kingdom. 
Participation in these associations also outflanks other organizing forms, containing 
between 30 and 40 percent of the population. By comparison, cultural, sports, civil 
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society, and professional associations combined contain less than 10 percent of the 
population.3 Not even the well-funded Islamist charities have matched the numbers or, 
more importantly, the growth of the family association trend since liberalization.4 
Scholars have documented the resurgence of identity divisions and tribalism in Jordan 
in the 1990s.' What we are witnessing is not as simple as a revival of preexisting 
identities. I demonstrate that family associations as they exist today in Jordan are a new 
trend altering ideas of kinship and identity. Kinship associations are actively constructed, 
often entailing the recruitment of "new" family members. Family genealogies have been 
rewritten, sometimes reaching back over a thousand years, to redefine the present kin 
group. Others split off from the larger group to create a smaller definition of family. In 
some cases, individuals are startled to find themselves belonging to a family they viewed 
as completely separate from their own and even hostile to it. 
As Polanyi observed, society responds to protect itself against the freeing of the 
market. 6 How it responds speaks volumes on the process of institutional creation. As 
historians and anthropologists have long understood, institutions do not arise from 
scratch, a fact that complicates the interpretation of social reality through formalistic 
lenses. The solution is not to abandon the theoretical search but to combine disciplinary 
approaches in the service of generating theories more closely approximating the real 
world. 
The rise of family associations in Jordan was due to a confluence of incentives affecting 
multiple social classes simultaneously in economic liberalization. Family associations 
are a societal trend; they do not contain the classic component of a social movement, 
namely, its demand-making and state-centered character.7 Indee~ the associations are 
generally little interested in the state, instead focusing on internal redistribution. The 
demise of state welfare services, combined with economic hardships caused by liber-
alization and the regional recession, produced a need and opportunity for new types of 
economic services and labor market connections. Employment contacts, integral to suc-
cess in this context, can be most effectively provided by cross-class kinship institutions 
due to the nature of Jordan's service-based economy. Political entrepreneurs used new 
kinship categories that could unite sufficient numbers to address both the economic goal 
of redistributive welfare for members and the political and social prestige desires of 
the leaders. The form of kinship used in these associations varies with the labor market 
and welfare opportunities the family is able to draw upon, demonstrating a complicated 
connection between economic variables and the genesis of identity institutions. 
In this article, I first present the theoretical explanation for the genesis of this new 
organizing trend.8 I then examine how this institution drew upon existing cultural tem-
plates but altered them significantly to create a distinct organizational form. The new 
form could furnish social welfare in the current economy, where the old styles of kin 
organizing could not. I then analyze these services and how family associations create 
viable employment networks with mechanisms of accountability and duty. Alterations in 
state-provided welfare furnished an opportunity to aspiring elites, indirectly encouraged 
by the state, to obtain symbolic capita19 by setting up their own kin associations. I 
examine the progression of kin-based social welfare among the differing groups in 
Jordan, linked to their relation to state-provided welfare. In conclusion, I suggest that 
whereas kinship associations can be included within a broad definition of civil society, 
their effect runs counter to that usually suggested by the term. Instead, the state obtained 
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a fragmented society shouldering the expense of social welfare, furthering state deliber-
alization policies. 
ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION, SOCIAL WELFARE, 
AND IDENTITY 
Despite the widely recognized importance of identity politics, 10 we know little about 
the precise mechanisms translating large-scale cultural, political, and economic changes 
into micro decisions and new allegiances. Constructivists have argued that identity and 
kinship 11 are not constant, but malleable and often used instrumentally. In the Middle 
East, changes in kinship have been demonstrated historically but seldom currently. 12 
Kinship is usually taken as a given, exogenous factor, more or less important depending 
on the context. Yet changes in practical identity are occurring throughout the Middle 
East, from "shaykhs made in Taiwan" in Iraq13-urbanites creating a new tribal identity 
for themselves-to the plethora of new Islarnist organizing forms. 
Approaches to the study of identity institutions focus either on the macro or the micro 
levels, with recent attempts to bridge the gap. Rational choice approaches rely upon 
methodological individualism, aggregating preferences smoothly and uniformly from 
the individual to generalize at the macro level. Ignored are the influence of recipro-
cal networks, the possibility of differential motivations, and the context within which 
choices are made. Societal-level explanations move from general pressures to individual 
decisions. Societal factors such as globalization or economic hard times have often been 
cited as spurring increases in identity politics, 14 through a rejection of the West, for 
example, the reaction of a minority group against assimilation pressures, or the rise of 
beneficial economic trade ties. This relationship is neither clear nor unmediated: winners 
along with losers have used exclusive identities. Left unexplained are the diversity of 
ascriptive organizing across countries, times, and subnational regions, and the triumph 
of religious, regional, or genealogical identity over potential rivals. Attempts to join the 
two approaches have been unsuccessful to date, lacking specification of the translation 
of pressures at one level to outcomes at the other. 
There has been a surprising lack of appreciation for differential incentives among 
socioeconomic groups in the genesis of identity institutions. Perhaps because multiple 
classes are included in these movements, differential class-based motivations have been 
viewed as unimportant to a movement's genesis. White notes that class and economic 
concerns were disregarded in Islamist debates, even when individuals specifically men-
tioned these factors. 15 The social movement literature has identified varying incentives 
and grades of membership. Motivations for leaders and members have been analyzed 
as qualitatively distinct, not merely a matter of scale. 16 The resource mobilization 
branch of social movement studies examined selective incentives or tangible bene-
fits for membership in formal social movement organizations, such as newsletters and 
special perks for paying members. Others identified varying levels of involvement in 
formal decentralized organizations and the informal networks loosely connected to 
them.17 
New social institutions contain a mix of incentives. Identity movements encompass 
multiple classes; thus, the analysis must account for the movement's simultaneous 
appeal to individuals in a wide range of social and economic circumstances, classes, and 
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status groups. Explaining new organizing forms entails the disaggregation of incentives 
by the type of benefit obtained. In a multiclass organization, equivalent motivations 
cannot be attributed to elites and middle and lower classes alike. Social groups have 
neither the same demands of a movement nor identical resources to offer. An institution 
may provide welfare for its members, but elites are motivated by other benefits. Their 
contribution of resources for organizational start-up and sustenance creates symbolic 
capital and sometimes electoral possibilities. Yet overemphasis on leaders amounts to 
neglect of the critical mass necessary for a movement, often regarding them as simply 
objects of elite manipulation. 
The analysis must begin with the critical juncture responsible for changing the playing 
field and giving rise to alternative conceptions of social organizing. As theorists of 
revolution have shown, a vacuum is a necessary precondition for territory to be won by 
a competitor. The causal chain in this case starts with the withdrawal of state welfare 
guarantees, which created the opportunity for the privatization of social provisioning. 
In 1989, Jordan began implementing International Monetary Fund policies to cope 
with worsening economic problems and obtain debt relief in the wake of the 1980s oil 
recession. These policies removed subsidies on basic goods and cut state employment, 
mechanisms for providing welfare to crucial interest groups. Increasingly vulnerable 
to international relative prices, the population has experienced a large decline in its 
standard of living and income. Prices on basic goods skyrocketed in the 1990s. Wages 
for state employees have been frozen amidst inflation. Poverty, declared by the World 
Bank effectively eliminated in the 1980s, was 30 percent by 2000. Many of the near 
poor no longer eat meat. Ironically, those hit hardest are from the regime's historical 
base of support and crucial to the state's own self-definition. 
Structural adjustment in Jordan entailed a change in the social rights and demarcation 
of duties between the state and society. In line with global trends, the state shed its 
previous public services and social provisioning roles, pushing these onto a private 
sector viewed as superior to the task.18 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were 
exhorted to fill the void left by the state, but what occurred was the formation of family 
associations, registered as charities or cooperatives, to provide welfare services. With 
worsening economic conditions, the population's search for alternative social insurance 
turned toward participation in reconstituted kinship groups. By the mid-1990s, when 
living standards decreased substantially, the trend toward kin organizing was in full 
swing. 
Economic neoliberal reforms alone are not responsible for the kin organizing out-
come. The prior welfare and economic trajectory of the country laid the basis for the 
poststructural adjustment trend. In particular, Jordan's economic regime of laissez-faire 
capitalism with indirect state investment and large-scale employment support resulted in 
significant regional discrepancies and underdevelopment. The service-oriented character 
of the economy remained, translating into an irregular and seasonal private labor market. 
Manufacturing was largely absent and remained so apart from the few export-processing 
zones. These economic factors both left a dearth of alternative organizations for welfare 
provision and provided the incentive for cross-class organizing on the part of the middle 
classes. Although service workers are notoriously difficult to organize, kinship united 
individuals across the sector and provided welfare under the guise of social provisioning 
to family members. Notably, employment networks are one of the main elements in 
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family associations, as is demonstrated by interviews and the informal qualifications for 
leadership in the organization, that is, the ability to provide jobs. 
NEW ASSOCIATIONS, OLD MODELS 
Family associations are collectively owned membership organizations. They formally 
register as either cooperatives or charitable organizations, with almost identical organi-
zational structures and programs. Membership is limited to kin. Although discrimination 
on the basis of origin is legally prohibited, it is widely practiced. 19 Funding is mainly 
derived internally. On average, three quarters of funding comes from yearly dues, dona-
tions, profits on investments, fees for services, and fund.raising parties or bazaars. Dues 
are usually paid either by the heads of (nuclear) families or all adult males.20 Leaders 
are elected by dues-paying members. 
The contemporary family association is an innovation on several older organizing 
forms.21 The association adapts and combines the tribal guesthouse or ma<fiifa, the family 
treasury or ~unduq 'ii'ill, and the internationally recognized model of a nongovernmental 
organization. This fonn of kin organizing was not invented anew in liberalization but 
existed previously among migrants and minorities as a means of providing welfare to 
the family or descendants of the ancestral village. However, until 1989, it had remained 
a limited organizing trend, used by those excluded from state-provided welfare. Subse-
quently, the formation of family associations increased considerably in both urban and 
rural areas, among nonmigrants and majority populations alike. 
The basis for the new organizing form comes from the matfiifa or tribal guesthouse. 22 
Historically, the ma<fiifa was a place for receiving guests in the shaykh's home, funded 
by him.23 It was used to socialize and visit during holy days and is where wedding 
celebrations, engagement parties, funeral gatherings, political meetings, and negotiations 
were held. 24 The new family association shares some of the same functions, but economic 
roles are now central and ceremonial aspects have been downgraded. Whereas upkeep 
for the guesthouse came from the tribal leader, the family association is cooperatively 
funded. Furthermore, the leadership is not fixed but elected, often amid competition. The 
new leadership comes from successful economic or professional elites, active in either 
private business or government. Many use alternative versions of kinship--a division 
of the family lower than the level of the tribe, for example-to supplant long-standing, 
hereditary leaders. With few exceptions, the family association retained the all-male 
character of the old guesthouse. 
Collective funding draws upon the tradition of the family treasury, an institution used 
by richer extended families, minorities, and migrants to provide insurance within the 
group. Kin contributed to a fund for emergencies, extraordinary expenses, or to help less 
fortunate members with medical, university, and other needs. The family treasury acted 
as redistributive social insurance, effectively uniting kin across distances and classes.25 
Shared financing elevates the leverage of members over elites, along with the perceived 
accountability of the organization. Leaders have wide discretion but cannot consistently 
shirk social welfare obligations. 
This combined form of organization is packaged as a grass-roots NGO. Statistically 
considered part of civil society, the state receives international aid and approval for them. 
Yet their charity is reserved for members. Some large kin associations aid nonrelatives 
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but only as a special project undertaken with funds separate from the general treasury. 
Furthermore, the class basis of most grass-roots organizations and family associations 
differs. Where grass-roots associations typically join individuals in similar economic and 
social circumstances, family association members span the economic spectrum. They 
unite thousands of individuals engaged in strikingly different occupations: informal 
street vendors and government ministers view their interests as served within the same 
organization. Likewise, their relation to the state differs. Whereas Christian base com-
munities in Latin America have attempted to carve out a sphere of autonomous local 
development, in Jordan family associations accede to state development plans without 
contestation. 
The state encouraged this trend by channeling registration and financial aid. Pre-
viously registered under the Ministry of Interior, the state now only allows familial 
associations to register as either charities or cooperatives, under the appropriate super-
vising institution. 26 Technically illegal by virtue of its restrictive membership, family 
organizing has been allowed throughout Jordan's history. The oldest associations retain 
the title "family of." Since at least the 1970s, the name of the kin association must 
differ, however minimally, from the family name. Often a letter is dropped from the 
family name or the village of origin is used. Supervising institutions award aid based 
on points accrued for the provision of particular welfare services. The state continually 
monitors the associations, auditing, approving, and maintaining records of their budgets 
on a regular basis. The governing body can refuse to register an organization, and once 
registered, can dissolve it for various reasons. By virtue of its data-gathering, monitoring, 
and approval functions, the supervisory organization for charities has been analyzed as 
corporatist, enhancing the state's ability to control and discipline society.27 
SERVICES AND INCENTIVES OF KIN ASSOCIATIONS 
The new organization pools and redistributes resources to supply a variety of welfare 
services suited to local labor markets. As a malleable idiom, kinship is able to unite 
various class incentives. Family associations provide services for both the lower and 
middle classes, providing monthly checks for the former and employment contacts for 
the latter. The services provided for the lower and middle classes demonstrate the distinct 
labor market in Jordan. Elites obtain symbolic capital or social prestige through the 
associations. Establishing themselves by differentiating among potential genealogical 
lineages, elites outside the traditionally powerful families build upon service provision 
to amass a clientele. Some of these association leaders attempt to use the kin group to 
launch electoral bids. A larger number of leaders are loosely affiliated politically with a 
party or movement. The associations can become fields for competing political trends 
and indirect electoral support. More often than not, such internal competition leads to 
the downfall of the organization as allegiances are split and kin unity lost. 
Although the motivations of the lower classes are relatively straightforward, obtaining 
direct welfare payments, it is the middle classes that are central to understanding the 
relative success of kinship networks over other organizing forms. It is their interest 
in seeking private forms of social insurance that paves the way for welfare-oriented 
kinship associations to become the dominant organizing trend in liberalization. Family 
associations may be one-stop shopping organizations for social welfare among multiple 
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classes, but the membership is predominantly middle class.28 Given the role that 
theorists of democracy have accorded the middle class, this development highlights the 
importance of "world time" in creating radically different class responses in differing 
historical eras. 
The key to understanding the rise of family associations lies in Jordan's service-
based economy and the ability of identity organizations, crossing economic class and 
sector, to provide business contacts and employment for the middle class after the 
removal of welfare. The shared identity in family associations creates concrete networks 
of obligation based on expectations of future reciprocity, not previously established or 
historical patterns of interaction. 29 Family associations are forward looking, widening the 
network of reciprocal connections and creating a link to other members and richer elites 
with labor market influence. In doing so, they reinforce differing corporate identities 
within society. 30 
Flexible specialization, atypical work patterns, and informal labor all use networks 
and often terms of kinship.31 In such economies, contacts serve as the main source of 
capital. 32 Maintaining friendships can be a condition of access to resources or claims 
upon others for aid. 33 Familial idioms are derived from lived relationships of work: 
a subcontractor becomes a "cousin." Open labor markets and job vulnerability are an 
integral part of this work structure. Individuals engage in social activities to maintain 
network connections, obtain jobs, or get out of a losing frrm in time. "Niceness" is 
a requirement here, because relationships are situationally and erratically relevant.34 
Although the causal chain in many flexible specialization production economies runs 
from employment patterns to recreated kinship, the reverse is occurring in the Jordanian 
case: familial networks are first being established for subsequent use in the labor market. 
By using a constitutive story35 combined with a cooperative, redistributive financial 
form, family associations tum the loose and general social obligation to help kin when-
ever possible into a solid and enforceable duty with repercussions for noncompliance. 
Providing job networks is not declared in any official association pronouncements, yet 
was the main concern for the majority of members surveyed. The expressed motivation, 
in the case of many families newly given the option of membership, was access to 
employment circuits. 
Forty-four percent from one urban association declared that increased business or 
employment was the primary benefit from membership in the family association. Re-
flecting the fit between patticular labor markets and kin networks, a large portion of 
family association attendees, 40 percent from a single association, were merchants or 
small business owners, including the owner of a supermarket, a phannacy, and a money-
changing establishment, along with a carpenter and computer software salesman. An 
additional 50 percent of regular attendees work in the professions or services, jobs that 
are dependent on contacts for continued business or employment. The family association 
promoted a pharmacy owner's establishment, for example, who subsequently received 
business from kin. Kin consumers frequenting other members' businesses receive a 
discount. In tum, they introduce friends to that business, advertise it, and increase the 
consumer base.36 One member, himself recently returned from exile for (leftist) political 
activity, stated that he does not know who his kin are, and he could be purchasing from 
someone's store without realizing it belongs to relatives. Knowing who among the family 
owns stores would lead him to patronize those and not competing businesses. 37 Others 
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reiterated the desire to know what businesses their returned kin are in and what services 
they can offer. 
As one member declared, "the family has expanded, and if we don't know each other, 
anything can happen to the miskin [ unfortnnate] among us. There is no other source of 
social security."38 Another stated, "Of course, I am personally against this community 
system-I am more for an individualistic approach-but in this economy and country, 
you have to do this. Here, the middle class cannot even buy a car. If you can, you are 
rich."39 The nature of Jordan's seesaw economy made organizing through family seem 
the way to provide social welfare, said one leader. Currently, young people's situation 
has worsened.40 In family associations, kin take care of each other. Associations create a 
formal group that the individual looks to for help, searching no further.41 Another leader 
stated tltat the bad economic circumstances of the 1990s are the driving force behind 
the establishment of family associations.42 A Palestinian member stated, "everyone 
is helping each other. We don't even know each other, we don't have connections. As 
Palestinians, we do not know where our relatives work, or how we can help each other. "43 
An analysis of leader professions demonstrates the connection to employment. Kin 
associations are established by newly prominent elites operating in either the government 
or private services sector, such as former parliamentary or cabinet members, bureaucrats, 
retired army officers, and directors in the large health service sector. The leaders are not 
from the traditionally powerful families, who are the subject of many analyses,44 but are 
middle status families or recent additions to the economic upper class. They are young 
men,45 averaging between their mid-30s and late 40s, from a range of occupations, 
reflecting both the local employment structure and the family's particular labor market 
position. All obtained financial success or powerful networks. They are socially active, 
often belonging to unions and civil society organizations before involvement in family 
associations.46 Their bid for leadership is founded on offering monetary support or 
employment connections or both. In general, the financially successful hail from the 
private sector, occasionally accumulating resources through stints of migration to the 
Gulf countries.47 Those only able to provide connections are linked to state employment, 
particularly in the rural areas. 
An example of an inclusive association demonstrates the strong role of the labor 
market in determining social allegiances: a Jordanian family joined with a Palestinian 
village to create a new family association in 1995, and the leader (Jordanian) identified 
himself as Palestinian. 48 After researching the roots of the lineage, the leaders of this 
future association traced their ancestry back to the Hijaz, Saudi Arabia, in the 17th 
century A.D. Part of this tribe had settled in Kerak, Jordan, whereas others went on 
to Palestine and settled in Yazour, near present-day Jaffa. The association contains 
individuals who consider themselves Jordanian and those who feel they are Palestinian; 
all now identify themselves as relatives. Separate diwiin had existed for the village kin 
from Yazour and those from Kerak, and news of the kinship between the two came 
as a surprise to prospective members.49 The leaders of the association hold prominent 
positions in the private sector, directing two private hospitals. 
The family association's activities start with the establishment of a place to meet, a 
hall or center. In addition to meetings, this place is used for pivotal events in the life 
cycle-funerals, weddings, and religious holidays.5° Then, the associations begin pro-
viding aid, including emergency financing; loans; regular monthly support for the poor, 
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unemployed, and widows; and in-kind aid during seasonal and religious occasions. All 
the associations in my survey provided financial aid, including regular support for poor 
families, around $20 per month, seasonal aid, emergency help, and loans. Some paid for 
medical bills. Seasonal aid is provided at the beginning of the school year for children's 
clothes and books, at the start of winter, and on religious holidays. 
Low- or no-cost loans are fundamental to family association services. These are 
obtained without the strict requisites of bank loans. Interviewees emphasized the im-
portance of obtaining such short-term, low-interest loans. As formal and government 
employment declined, collateral for bank loans became difficult to provide. The main 
alternative to public-sector employment domestically is the service sector, which lacks 
the formality or job security required to obtain bank loans or advances on paychecks. 
Educational loans and healthcare clinics are other high priorities for family associations. 
Existing family associations altered their array of services to parallel the newly 
established organizations, emphasizing labor market and financial aid. Service provision 
only became prominent in the 1990s for most of these older associations. 51 An increase 
in needy families was often cited, along with a change in the types of people in need. 
Furthermore, membership rates within older family associations have risen. Whereas 
previously only a handful attended yearly meetings, a larger portion of the membership is 
now active. Meetings went from fifteen to hundreds of attendees, and included a distinct 
change in the membership. Professionals, such as doctors, lawyers, and professors, are 
newly active in kin associations, many having previously rejected such organizing on 
the grounds that it is traditional and outdated. 
Family associations also provide services more directly related to the labor market, 
such as training sessions and child-care, predominantly geared toward women. These 
programs are financially supported by the state. Training programs are generally run by 
urban associations, whereas child-care dominates association programs in the rural areas. 
Although the urban trainings do not match labor market needs, the state obtains funding 
for these programs from international aid organizations, particularly for female-targeted 
lessons (see Table 1). 
Rural associations provide the same basic welfare aid, monthly support to poor fami-
lies, in addition to nonfinancial services crucial to household income strategies. Child-
care services furnished by the associations allow women to work in the state-promoted 
export processing zones. Since liberalization, the establishment of nurseries by family 
associations for very young children has skyrocketed in rural and presumably traditional 
areas. According to officials in the export-processing zones, these nurseries are needed 
for women from the surrounding villages to place their children while they work, sewing 
garments for export to the United States.52 Almost all child-care institutions outside the 
urbanized capital are charitable, most of which are village- or kin-organized. Nurseries in 
the northern rural regions, where 28 percent of the national population resides, increased 
from eighteen to thirty-four in the six years after 1993, and in the south, with IO percent 
of the population, the number rose from ten to sixteen. Irbid in the north increased 
its charitable nurseries by 400 percent in that period. 53 These areas are situated within 
daily bus transport to export zones. Charitable nurseries in Ma 'an in the rural south 
doubled from four to eight, and in Mafraq, they increased over threefold from three to 
ten in the same period. In just the two years from 1997 to 1999, nurseries in northern 
Irbid and Mafraq increased by 66 percent and 43 percent, respectively.54 Kindergartens, 
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TABLE I. Breakdown of training 
programs run by sample 
charitable associations 























Source: Compiled from interviews and General 
Union of Voluntary Societies, "Profile of multi-
purpose associations." The number of participants 
ranges from five to forty, with beauty trainings 
invariably drawing the most attendees. 
serving as primary school education, also increased in liberalization. Kin-run kinder-
gartens are more inexpensive than state-run schools, whose fees increased significantly 
in liberalization (during the austerity or IMF riots in 1996, the Ministry of Education 
offices were targeted). Over 50 percent of charitable associations in the rural areas have 
kindergartens. 55 The number of kindergartens in the southern region increased from 79 
to 141, and in the northern from 138 to 155.56 The number of kindergartens in Kerak, 
Tafileh, Ma'an, and Aqaba increased by 21, 6, 13, and 23, respectively.57 Ajloun in the 
north witnessed an increase in the number of kindergartens by two-thirds between just 
1997 and 1999.58 
Although social services are being taken over by family associations, their ability 
to fulfill these obligations is questionable. Association leaders complained of rising 
costs and the difficulty of providing quality services at low prices. Indeed, although 
some associations have financially successful investments, most are shoestring affairs 
operating on a yearly budget of a couple of thousand dollars. 
WELFARE PROVISIONING AND KIN ORGANIZING 
THROUGH TIME 
The time line of the family association trend demonstrates the link between state welfare 
provision, particular definitions of the family, and involvement in the labor market. The 
group's relation to state welfare determined the time line of family association formation; 
the precise version of kinship embodied in the association was a consequence of labor 
market position.59 The various social groups formed family associations in different eras, 
coinciding with their connection to state welfare and employment, which in turn reflects 
the group's location in the state's social base of support (Table 2). The definition offamily 
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TABLE 2. Group welfare status, labor market position, and organizing outcomes 
State Welfare 
Formal Kin Organizing 
Group Status Pre-1989 Labor Market Position Pre-1989 Post-1989 
Jordanian Christians Limited Private services and Yes: exclusive No difference 
some public 
employment 
Palestinians None Private sector: professional, Some: inclusive Yes: inclusive 
services, and regional 
employment 
Jordanian Muslims Complete State employment No Yes: exclusive 
Rural communities Complete State employment, No Yes: exclusive 
agriculture 





to the membership 
Exclusive 
Jordanian Christians (and 
other minorities) mainly 
prior to 1989 (urban) 
Jordanian Muslims after 
1989 (urban and suburban} 
Rural communities after 
1989 (formal) 
Inclusive 
Palestinians, prior to 1989 
and especially after (urban) 
Prior to 1989, Jordanian 
Muslims (informal) 
that was used, expansive or restrictive, inclusive or exclusive, is directly related to the 
group's employment concentration (Table 3). Inclusive definitions open to more kin; 
exclusive ones narrow the family, generally at the seven generation or family surname 
level. As public employment declines, narrow definitions of kin dominate families in this 
sector. By contrast, lineage for families in the private sector has broadened, increasing 
the number of available networks and resources. 
Family associations have adapted and changed in accord with their audiences and 
markets, their potential kinship bases, and the economic realities they address. They 
simultaneously draw upon and alter existing ideas of the family. Most differ somewhat 
from previous concepts of the family but not enough to be viewed as manufacturing 
identity from scratch. Families combine out of a sense of historical closeness or geo-
graphical proximity, such as residence in the same village. Alternatively, new kinship 
definitions split the previous group into smaller units. Many of the associations contain a 
few thousand members, smaller than a tribe but usually larger than a single family-name 
group. 
Kinship in the Arab world incorporates numerous levels of familial relations, all of 
which are potential organizing bases. Ghabra notes that kinship in the Middle East is 
situational: precise lineages cannot determine who is or is not family; practical social 
networks determine kinship.6° Family can be defined through genealogical blood line, 
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tribe, village of origin, or present village of residence.61 Tribe, the usual translation 
for 'ash'ira or qablla, is a large, multigeneration descent group that includes smaller 
groups of clans and extended families.62 The tribe can split into groups containing 
just seven generations of the lineage, the ~amula. Village is another potential kinship, 
which can encompass several tribes.63 International and rural to urban migration have 
often produced organizing based on hometown origin or extended kinship. 64 Returning 
migrants in parts of Africa65 and the Sudan66 invested in hometown associations. In 
Tajikistan, lineages were rewritten to accommodate displacement and connections to the 
state administration, subsequently constituting new tribes. 67 Income earned by expatriate 
workers in Yemen was remitted to the immediate family along ascriptive identity lines, 
exacerbating those social group distinctions. 68 
The first groups to organize family associations in Jordan were Jordanian Christians 
and Droze, minorities allied to the state, during the 1950s and 1960s. 69 Although 
they were regime supporters, these groups were not the primary social base for the 
Hashemites. Their ability to tap state welfare was circumscribed. Currently, few are 
employed in the public sector, but some do hold midlevel management positions with 
significant influence. By and large, they work in domestic-based services as employers, 
owners, and professionals, and are not heavily involved in regional migration.70 To 
provide welfare for the family, they formed associations using a restricted version of 
kinship and turned welfare and access to the state bureaucracy into a club good. 
The Palestinians, left out of state-provided social welfare, drew on broad kin net-
works to obtain social insurance in their precarious economic condition (see Figure 1). 
These Palestinians found domestic, international, and regional employment primarily in 
services such as construction, administration, the bureaucracy, and professions. In the 
1960s and especially the 1970s, some Palestinian family associations were established. 
Separated from the land that had formed the basis of their livelihood (most had been 
farmers), the migrants pursued a professional education that would allow them mobility, 
the ability to practice anywhere. Unable to count on state largesse for jobs, Palestinians 
worked in the private sector. Wide-ranging employment contacts were necessary, not 
only domestically but also within the region and internationally as Palestinians searched 
for work outside their new residence. Inclusive kinship aided their life chances in state-
lessness. Coping strategies included the wife's kin, an innovation in family practices, 
along with additional selected kin. According to one analyst, "family became the means 
by which the Palestinians were able to respond to the conditions of the diaspora. "71 
That family was almost always defined as village of origin. Based on the home village, 
Palestinian associations cast a wide net and drew in thousands of members.72 In the 
refugee camps, Palestinians settled among former neighbors and villagers. Jordanian 
state practices furthered this use of home village, because the government used the 
village leader or mukhtar as an administrative intermediary.73 Family associations in 
Jordan served as transit and networking centers for kin to and from the West Bank.,74 
and some associations have branches in Kuwait and even the United States.75 
Still, family associations remained a marginal phenomenon in the 1970s and through-
out most of the 1980s, despite being one of the only organizing forms permitted by 
the state. The impetus for such associations was not overwhelming, because the state 
provided the general population with urban consumer subsidies, and some employment 
and healthcare. Furthermore, Palestinians had access to plentiful work opportunities in 
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FIGURE 1. The Lifta Village Family Tree. Source: Lifta Charitable Association, Amman and Zarqa (n.d.). 
Reprinted with permission. 
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the Gulf. Economic liberalization introduced the main stimulus for family organizing. 
Previously unorganized Palestinians established family associations, and those who had 
an organization for the individual family joined with others to form a larger association 
based on broader kinship. The return of workers due to political liberalization and the 
1990-91 Gulf War was indirectly related to the rise of kin associations. 76 Individuals 
returning to Jordan, from the west or the Gulf, who migrated for political or economic 
reasons, represented an expanded pool of potential kin.77 
Jordanian Muslims, the main regime allies, have restricted the definition of family. 
In urban and suburban areas, tribes began dividing into smaller units, often the /µlmiila 
or seven-generation family,78 and registering this as the association. Electoral realign-
ments demonstrate this trend. One tribe traces its descent back to 1717 in Palestine. 
Acknowledging the various potential bases for defining his family, which could include 
inhabitants of the West Bank, the author of the tribe's history instead delineates the 
family exclusively, eliminating most potential kin.79 
With unrestricted welfare through public sector jobs, Jordanian Muslims remained 
unorganized until liberalization began to withdraw those prerogatives. Some organized 
informally before liberalization. These associations were extremely inclusive, akin to the 
old style tribal organization. The leader was in control of the organization and members 
did not own or contribute significantly to its upkeep. Not only is kinship now redefined 
narrowly, but the new association's form transfers significant control from the leader to 
the membership. 
Last to organize were the rural communities.80 The kin association here is largely a 
product of state encouragement, replacing alternative community or class-based pos-
sibilities. The family association, designed to provide accountable networks for the 
membership in a service-oriented economy, was promoted by the state as a legitimate 
form of organizing once it had become an established model in urban life. Here, the 
configuration of classes and services differs.81 Rural associations lack the grassroots 
character of community development associations; they are clearly dominated from 
the top. Due to the prior production profile, the rural areas are devoid of a substantial 
middle class. The associations are smaller than urban ones, often with just a few dozen 
members (they officially list between a few hundred and a thousand members), and are 
almost always led by retired army officers or goveroment officials. Members' dues and 
participation are largely absent, and association attendance is low. 82 Funding for most 
rural organizations is provided mainly by the state. These rural associations mirror their 
urban counterparts in the conceptualization of kinship as the idiom of solidarity, and 
many are composed of only one or two families.83 
CONCLUSION 
Family associations do not reflect but have created an identity movement in Jordan. The 
social importance of the family association to members' daily lives has heightened due 
to its welfare role. Nonparticipation of kin has been made more difficult due to this role 
and to the high level of institutionalization and formalization. 84 This analysis of family 
associations demonstrates the dynamics of institutional creation, drawing from but al-
tering past cultural repertoires to provide for needs generated in the modern, globalized 
economy. Furthermore, this examination has demonstrated the powerful role of state 
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welfare and its absence in social opportunities for advancing subnational identities. The 
precise incentives for membership in these reconstituted families show how different 
economic formations give rise to pressures and networks distinct from manufacturing-
based class organizing. 
The new welfare-providing institutions create enduring lines of social mobilization 
and identification, channeling individual identity through the family in exchange for 
access to fundamental economic goods. That the organization through which economic 
goals are rationally pursued is based on the idiom of identity has important consequences. 
Claiming to be an alternative and equal form of welfare provision, family associations 
disguise the shift in state services and the increasing income polarization in Jordan. 
The most consequential effect of family associations has been to reinforce the de-
clining significance of the national political arena and facilitate the state's policy of 
deliberalization.85 Deliberalization policies have limited freedoms of speech and orga-
nizing, preventing the expression of dissent for government policies. This deliberaliza-
tion is aided by removing from the political realm a critical economic issue in the lives 
of ordinary Jordanians. Devolving welfare provision onto kin associations fragments 
civil society into particularistic blocks and prevents unified demands along economic 
lines. As more of the populace is willing to sell its vote for entrance into employment 
and social welfare networks, national politics becomes increasingly depoliticized. In the 
short-run, this change is welcomed by the state. But the move of ideological activists into 
subnational kinship associations and the delegitimation of the national political arena 
may in the long-run pose a larger threat to the state's vision of a docile society. 
Formalized family associations are not reactionary responses to a globalized world. 
They represent an attempt to deal with changes caused by relatively open borders even 
as they cripple demand-based mobilization for policy changes at the national level. The 
hope for a meager portion of resources from among fellow kin is sufficient incentive to 
justify the costs of these organizations, both in terms of the time and money spent by 
leaders and the sacrifice of autonomy by members. The educated middle class, including 
academics, doctors, and other professionals who previously eschewed the use of kin, 
now participate en masse. Their decision solves a key piece to the puzzle of resurgent 
identity politics. 
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